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1. Expanding the Definition of Crisis 
The modern concept of cnSIS management， or kiki加nri.first began to 
permeate ]apanese society in 1962， inconnection with US President John F. 
Kennedy's handling of the Guban missile crisis. 
Kennedy faced a huge dilemma at the time. If he a110wed the Soviet Union to 
deploy nuclear missiles in Cuba (a Soviet a11y)， itwould alter the balance of 
power by putting the United States under the constant出reatof nuclear attack. 
Yet if he followed the advice of his hawkish military advisors and ordered the 
bombing of the Cuban missile bases， he risked triggering a nuclear world war. 
Even if the United States triumphed in the end. its victory would only come 
after nuclear bombs had devastated multiple US cities. taken count1ess 
American lives， and exposed survivors to toxic levels of radiation for years to 
come. 
Facing a nationa1 crisis， Kennedy took a gamble by instituting a blockade 
and announced that incoming Soviet ships would be boarded and inspected. It 
was clear that since no Soviet ship commander could a110w such an inspection. 
any attempt to break the blockade would lead to loca1 hostilities that could 
easily escalate to full-sca1e war-a war出atwould leave 'the Soviet Union in 
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ruins. Kennedy's announcement signaled that the Unit疋dStates would not 
shrink from nuclear war. Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev interpreted this 
warning correctly and finally agreed to remove the missiles， thus resolving the 
CrlS1S. 
In ] apan， the White House's handling of the situation was analyzed as肌
example of kiki kanri-a direct translation of the English "crisis management" 
and a term new to the majority of] apanese. Because of也isearly context， use of 
the term kiki kanri was at first limited to situations involving national crises加 d
their handing by politicalleaders. 
It was not until much later that kiki kanri came to be applied to the handling 
of emergencies stemming from natural disasters. In 1995， inthe wake of the 
Great Hanshin (Kobe) Earthquake， the ]apanese government came under 
harsh criticism not simply for its response to that particular situation but for its 
general ineptitude in the face of crises. After that term kiki (crisis) began to be 
used much more broadly， in reference to any event or situation-whether 
natural or human in origin-that threatened serious harm to society. 
Accordingly， kiki kanri encompassed the response of leaders or governing 
systems to any such event or situation. 
The Great Hanshin Earthquake was a disaster of huge proportions， but it 
was not the sort of crisis that threatened the nation's survival. Because of this， 
and because of the central government's inadequate response， the disaster left 
behind it a new and lasting realization that local governments， businesses， and 
communities needed their own kiki kanri know寸lOW，systems， and resources. 
Of course， other national governments have experienced similar failures in 
recent years. The French government was faulted for its response to the 2003 
heat wave that killed thousands， particularly elderly citizens living alone， and 
President George W. Bush was harshly criticized for the US government's 
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response to Hurricane Katrina， which devastated New Orleans in 2005. Like the 
Great Hanshin Earthquake， these were not national crises， strictly speaking， yet 
they called for a comparable response. 
Be that as it may， itwould appear that出escope of kiki kanri in J apan ωday 
is broader than the concept of crisis management in the United States and 
elsewhere， since it encompasses not only crisis management in a narrow sense 
but also emergency management and even， aswe shall see， risk management. In 
the United States， crisis management， emergency management， and risk 
management are more or less distinct concepts. Major disasters are handled by 
the Federal Emergency Management Agency (not the "Crisis Management 
Agency")， but in J apanese that organ is frequently referred to as the Kiki Kanri 
Cho. Simi1arly， New York City's Office of Emergency Management is generally 
called the Kiki Kanri Kyoku in Japanese. To be sure， the US media sometimes 
used the term crisis in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina， but generally 
speaking， the government response to such events is termed "emergency 
management" in American English， not "crisis management." The J apanese， 
however， commonly use the term kiki kanri in reference to Hurricane Katrina 
and the response of the federal government and other agencies. In short， the 
J apanese kiki kanri∞vers both crisis management and emergency manage-
ment. 
In China， a critical test of the government's abi1ity to respond to 
emergencies came in the wake of the Sichuan earthquake of May 2008. 
According to the Chinese government， the magnitude 8.0 quake affected 46 
mil1ion people and left some 88，000 dead or missing. N umerous school buildings 
collapsed， ki1ling thousands of chi1dren. Landslides fi1led in portions of rivers， 
creating approximately 100 natural dams that threatened to bre出叩dbury 
vast areas in mud and rubble. 
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With the Beijing Olympics approaching that summer， the Chinese 
government viewed the situation as a national crisis threatening the survival of 
the government itself. It applied itself to recovery and rehabilitation using a 
system called duikou zhiyuan， or"partnership support，" in which a province or 
major city was ass加ledto assist each of the hardest hit counties or 
county-level cities. (China's system of local government has four basic levels: 
provincial， prefectural， county， and municipal.) Beijing was ass邸 edto Shifang， 
Shanghai to Dujiangjan， Jiangsu Province to Mianzhu， and so forth. The ratio of 
a supporting area's population to that of its partner had to be at least 99 to 1. and 
the supporting area was required to contribute at least 1% of its fiscal budget 
over a period of three years to support relief and rehabilitation measures 
formulated in consultation with the victims. Chengdu， the capital of Sichuan， 
was not assigned a supporting partner-even though it sustained a great deal of 
damage， including more than 4，000 deaths-because it is a major city itself. 
Shifang， a county-level city with a population of about 430，000 (Jess than half 
of which live in the city per se)， had close to 6，000 casualties. Under the 
partnership support program， Beijing assisted with rehabilitation by building 
public housing; an expanded and improved municipal hospital; kindergartens; 
elementary， middle， and high schools; vocational training schools; and an 
industrial park. It also widened 68 kilometers of roadway， built 11 bridges， and 
reinforced river embankments. At one time several hundred Beijing municipal 
employees were living in Chengdu in order to supervise and support these 
proJects. 
The thinking behind this system is that relying on local civil servants is 
more efficient出血 mobilizingnational agencies because local 0宜icialshave a 
better understanding of the on叩 sitechallenges involved in the construction of 
housing， roads， and so forth. In fact， under the partnership support system， 
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reconstruction plans projected to take three years were completed in two. This 
sort of teamwork was an outgrowth of China's perception of the disaster as a 
national crisis and its decision to treat recovery and reconstruction as a 
nationwide undertaking. 
In J apan's case， as we have seen， no real distinction exists between crisis 
management and emergency management. From 1995 on， a growing awareness 
of the key role of local government in emergencies was accompanied by the 
spread of the concept of kiki kanri， which for local governments was largely 
focused on disaster response. From that time on， local government units 
charged with disaster countermeasures (saなα taisaku) were typically 
renamed using the term kiki kanri， although the emphasis on disasters (抑留.ai)
remained much the same. 
As defined in article 2， paragraph 1，of也e1961 Disaster Countermeasures 
Basic Act (Saigai Taisaku Kihon Ho)， saigai includes not only "extreme natural 
phenomena， such as windstorms， rainstorms， snowstorms， floods， storm surges， 
earthquakes， tsunami， and volcanic eruptions，" but also disasters of human 
origin， such as "large fires or explosions." Moreover， under the same law，出e
definition could be expanded by cabinet order to include any other 
phenomenon 、omparableto the foregoing in respect to the degree of harm 
caused." Under that provision， "massive releases of radioactivity" and "ship-
wrecks affecting a large number of people" were later included by cabinet 
order， and subsequent revisions have expanded the definition to cover al "0セher
large-scale accidents." The breadth of出isdefinition is reflected in the scope of 
kiki kanri in the context of local government. 
2剛 Expandingthe Concept of Management 
In the foregoing we focused on the process by which the ]apanese concept of 
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kiki kanri expanded along the kiki (crisis) axis， until it included both crisis 
management and emergency management. But the concept has also expanded 
along the kanri axis， until it now embraces not only the immediate response to 
an emergency situation but also prevention， recovery， and reconstruction. 
Recently published books on kiki kanri aimed at local administrators and 
business managers typically begin with sections on prevention， preparation， and 
response training and conclude with follow-up measures. Kiki kanri books that 
deal with disaster response by local agencies almost invariably include 
long-term recovery and reconstruction as well as short-term actions. 
The broad application of kiki kanri mirrors the scope of J apan's Disaster 
Countermeasures Basic Act. The focus of the law is bosai， which is often 
translated "disaster prcvention" but is defined more broadly in article 2， 
paragraph 2， as "preventing disaster before it occurs， preventing the spread of 
damage in the event of a disaster， and recovering from disaster" (article 2， 
paragraph 2). In this way， kiki kanri not only expanded vertically， to include 
natural disasters and other emergencies under the heading of kiki， but also 
spread horizontally， toinclude prevention as well as relief and recovery under 
the rubric of kanri. In the English-speaking world， prevention generally comes 
under the heading of risk management， not crisis management or emergency 
management. But in J apan kiki如nrioften embraces al three concepts. 
In Spain， the Centre de Recerca en Governanca del Risc (Research Center of 
Risk Governance， or GRISC) at the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona 
receives funding from the business community to provide practicing 
professionals with opportunities for hands-on， real-world， graduate-level 
research and training in emergent risk in contemporary urban society. Topics 
of study include negotiating risk， risk of social exclusion， biohazard risk in the 
food industry and the environment， and risk in education. The center's basic 
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mission is similar in many ways to that of the recently established Graduate 
School of Governance Studies at Meiji University， but it distinguishes itself by a 
risk-oriented approach to the public-policy issues of urban society. 
In an international context， the ]apanese certainly need to be aware of the 
fact that kiki kanri may have a wider scope than its counterpartぉinEng日shand
other Western languages. But 1 believe the broad scope and application of kiki 
kanri has practical benefits. The rising awareness on the part of local 
governments and businesses of the need to study， draw up， practice， and 
continuously improve their plans and policies for dealing with any situation that 
could cause serious harm to society or the community is an extremely 
important and positive trend. 
One practical reason underlying the expanding scope of kiki kanri is the fact 
that， while crises come in many forms， the basic elements of an effective 
response are fairly constant， and many of the lessons learned from one crisis are 
applicable to others. In that sense， the trend toward a more inclusive concept of 
kiki kanri attests to the growth and evolution of the field. 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11， 2001， discussions of crisis and 
emergency management in the United States focused on the need to integrate 
previously segregated functions. This emphasis came about as a reaction to the 
sectionalism也atmany blamed for the US federal government's failure to " 
connect the dots" and anticipate the 9/11 attacks despite numerous signs and 
warmngs. 
In the case of an industrial plant. for example， security measures typically 
focus on preventing trespassing， theft， or sabotage. But unless those measures 
are formulated as part of a total package that includes safety measures， the 
facility's safety weaknesses can become security gaps that terrorists or others 
can exploit. For this reason， recent trends cal for coordinated safety and 
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security policies， as well as organizational integration of a company's safety and 
security units to ensure good communication. At a more basic level， the focus on 
integration 1eads to an emphasis on crisis management as an integral function of 
an organization's top management. Here， too， evo1ution has been accompanied 
by a shift from a narrower focus to broader one. 
The extension of kiki知nrito risk management is a1so connected with the 
rise of business continuity p1anning. BCP is a form of organizational risk 
management that incorporates various safety mechanisms-backup facilities， 
data storage services， and so forth-to ensure that a business can keep 
operating under adverse conditions. When such concerns are incorporated， the 
subject of kiki kσnri may extend even to ways of preparing for a business 
partner's collapse or paralysis. 
As the foregoing indicates， the tendency in J apan has been toward an 
ever-broader interpretation of kiki as any situation posing a grave hazard to an 
organization， community， or society， and of kiki kanri as the prevention of， 
response to，叩drecovery from such situations. Given出istrend， 1 be1ieve we 
must continue to expand our interpretation of "crisis" when discussing kiki kanri 
in the context of local government 
1 served as Tokyo vice-governor in charge of crisis management and chief 
of on-site disaster management headquarters during the emergency precipi-
tated by the volcanic eruptions on Miyakejima in 2000. Since then， 1 have aigued 
for widening the scope of crisis management theory to include crises of a1l 
types， on the practical grounds that the basics of an effective response are much 
the same， regardless of the nature of the crisis. 1 have customarily used tab1es 1 
and 2 when making this case， but it would seem these charts are a1ready 
becoming outdated. 
With the foregoing in mind， let us examine some reaI-life cases that offer 
8 ガパナンス研究 NO.8 (2012年)
Table 1. Types 01 Crisis (Kiki) 
Category Examples 
Natural disasters Flooding. earthquakes. volcanic eruptions 
Accidents Explosions. power outages. transportation accidents 
Incidents Hostage taking. extortion. corruption 
Epidemic Outbreaks of virulent strains of influenza or other diseases 
Terrorism Bombings. kidnapping. other acts of violence 
War Civil war. foreign invasion. etc. 
Organizational response to emergency (fast communication. top-down decision making) 
Table 2. Crisis Management Matrix 
Experience Prevention Prediction Preparation Response Evacuation Recovery Re∞問truction
FJod 
Earthquake 
VoJcanic eruption 
Accident 
Jncident 
Epidemic 
Terrorism 
War 
local administrators instructive examples of crises and pertinent lessons for kiki 
kanri under this ever-expanding definition. 
3. Expanding the Reach of Kiki Kanri: Recent Examples 
(1) Solitary Death 
1 have argued elsewhere that the challenge of building social capital in Qur cities 
is well within the capability of local administrators， providing they have the wil 
to work toward a long-range vision of the city's釦tureinstead of focusing on the 
next election. Stil， big cities around the world have struggled with social policy， 
and their track record is not encouraging. Whenever 1 see the staggering scale 
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of slum conditions and homelessness in US cities like Washington DC. New 
Y ork， Chicago. and Los Angeles or in European cities like Paris and London. 1 
invariably come away feeling that Tokyo comes of pretty well by comparison. 
Given the relatively limited scale of Tokyo's poverty problems. the city could 
eliminate homelessness altogether if it chose to make the effort. We must begin 
by passing laws that force the government to provide permanent housing and 
employment (with emphasis on the百ermanent")for the homeless instead of 
allowing them to congregate in public places like parks， streets. riverbanks， and 
shopping malls. (Some may protest that prohibiting the homeless from sleeping 
and loitering in such places is a violation of their rights， but 1 would argue that 
也ereal disregard to human rights consists in alloyving homelessness to 
continue.) Now is the time to address this emerging crisis. 
Another crisis facing al the world's m司orcities in the twenty-first century 
is the problem of isolation. In Tokyo the problem became brutally apparent 
during the long heat wave of 2010. In the course of one month. from July 17 to 
August 16， the 23 wards of Tokyo recorded 100 deaths from heat disorders. 
Among the victims， .90 percent were 65 or older， 70 percent lived alone. and 96 
percent died inside their homes. While al these people died from natural causes， 
there is litle doubt that many could have been saved had thcir situation been 
discovered in time. This fact， together with the insult to human dignity that 
occurs when a body is discovered in an advanced state of decomposition， make 
solitary death a social problem. And underlying it is an even more fundamental 
urban problem. namely， the disintegration of the family and the community. 
Solitary death is but a manifestation of this basic problem facing big cities 
everywhere. 
Instances of solitary death in Tokyo are on the rise in general， not just 
during heat waves. According to a study by the Tokyo Metropolitan 
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Government Medical Examiner's Office， inTokyo's 23 wards the number of 
cases in which people living alone died in their homes in "unusual circumstan-
ces" soared from approximately 1，100 in 1987 to about 3，400 in 2006. Men 
accounted for two-thirds of these cases. In the case of women， discovery of也e
body took 6 days on average， while for men ittook 12. Overall， men are more apt 
to be isolated from family and community than women. 
In his 2002 book Heat Wave， Eric Klinenberg (currently a professor at New 
York University) provides a detailed analysis of the disastrous Chicago heat 
wave of 1995 that took the lives of more than 750 people.日econcludes that the 
rates of solitary death were much higher in neighborhoods abandoned by 
business. It seems that in places where business has declined， family and 
community ties have deteriorated as well. According to Klinenberg， solitary 
deaths are relatively rare in the Latino， J ewish， Vietnamese， Chinese， and 
Japanese communities， probably because in the United States， these ethnic 
groups tend to maintain strong community and family ties. By contrast， the rate 
of solitary death among older African American men is relatively high. 
In France， the heat wave由atswept Europe in 2003 killed nearly 15，000 
people， 2，300 in Paris alone. According to French government findings t， the 
victims were preponderantly elderly people living alone in small apartments. 
Casualties from that year's heat wave were also an issue in Britain， whose 
Health Protection Agency deals with weather emergencies as well as 
everything from influenza to chemical attacks. 
In reaction to these deaths， both France and Britain began issuing warnings 
whenever high temperatures were anticipated and urging people to drink 
plenty of water. In addition， French laws were amended to require hospitals and 
nursing homes to have air-conditioned rooms (previously considered unneces-
sary， astemperatures in most of France do not often rise very high). 
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This response by France and Britain reveals an approach to solitarγdeath 
as a national crisis-management issue. If we approach it a big-city problem， 
however， itpoints us to the underlying cause， namely， isolation from family and 
community. Warnings and similar band-aid measures wil not solve such a 
problem. We need to deal with solitary death as a symptom of deeper social 
problems. 
(2) Renovation of Aging Condominiums 
According to J apanese government statistics， J apan had more than 5.6 million 
condominium units nationwide as of the end of 2009. More than 1 million of these 
were built prior to 1986， and therefore incorporate obsolete earthquake 
resistance standards. 
The standards for earthquake resistance under J apan's Building Standards 
Law were revised in 1986 to require al buildings built subsequently to be 
capable of withstanding intensity-7 seismic tremors-up from intensity 6 under 
previous regulations. This means that structures built prior to that time are in 
danger of collapsing in an earthquake if the seismic intensity exceeds 6. 
Individual residents may prefer to risk their lives in old， substandard housing 
rather than deal with renovation， and viewed from a personal standpoint， that is 
a legitimate decision. But from a societal standpoint. such conditions cannot be 
allowed to persist because they endanger others. When a building collapses in 
阻 earthquake，it can not only injure and kil those inside and outside the 
building but also cut of escape routes and block access by emergency vehicles. 
Recognizing the need to facilitate structural renovation of older apartment 
and condominium buildings， the government passed legislation for that purpose 
in 2002 (Manshon Tatekae Enkatsuka Ho). Unfortunately， renovation of 
substandard building has made almost no progress siuce出en.This is not to say 
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出atthe legislation is meaningless， but it provides neither the legal authority nor 
the financial support needed to ensure that old apartments and condominiums 
are brought up to standard 
The legal problem is that the law does not deny individuals the standing to 
sue to block renovation of a building when the majority of residents favor it. 
This had led to several instances in which residents have moved into temporary 
quarters in anticipation of renovation， only to find the process held up for years 
while a few recalcitrant owners battle the decision in court. This sort of 
situation can seriousJy disrupt people's lives and finances， and the potential for 
such disruption makes residents alJ the more hesitant to embark on renovation. 
Financing is the other major problem. 1n the case of buildings in desirable 
locations， such as city centers and areas close to commuter-train and subway 
stations， residents can use the sale of surplus units to cover part of the costs， but 
in less desirable neighborhoods， they must foot the entire bi1 if they want to 
renovate. If the building's residents lack financiaJ resources or are too old to 
qualiかforloans， construction cannot proceed even if everyone in the building is 
in favor of renovation. 
Changes in urban planning reguJations since a building was constructed may 
mean that the building no longer conforms to standards pertaining to lot size 
and floor area. 1n such cases， structuraJ renovation may entail a reduction in 
total floor space， and huge additional expenses may be required to 
accommodate al the original residents in the newly renovated building. 
For these reasons， the market mechanism alone cannot ensure that aging 
condominiums wi1 be rebuilt. Government support is needed to promote 
renovation， especially in densely inhabited areas where substandard buildings 
couJd seriously undermine effective disaster prevention and response. When the 
market mechanism fails， itis the job of public housing policy to correct the 
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situation. Such a policy is needed now to ensure that aging condominiums are 
appropriately renovated. 
The deterioration of housing can have serious social consequences， as we 
know from other major cities. In New York City， dilapidated public housing 
projects in Harlem， Queens， and Brooklyn have turned into hotbeds of poverty 
and crime. Once a housing development becomes a slum， itc血 takemany years 
to turn the community around. This argues for aggressive public policies to 
prevent such a decline. 
Brownsville in Brooklyn is famous for its housing projects. Altogether they 
comprise more than 30，000 units housing about 120，000 people. Whi While a few 
are low-rise， most are high-rise apartment buildings of 10 to 12 stories. 
Brownsville was already regarded as a slum as early as 1910. The area was 
also known as a haven for socialists and other radicals through the mi小20th
century. Much of the public housing developments built there around the 
middle of the century declined quickly， especially in the 1960s and 1970s， and the 
community became virtually synonymous with urban poverty and crime. Some 
even say that the image of American public housing complexes as 
drug-infested slums had its beginnings in Brownsville. 
While 1 was visiting New York in February 2011， a subway 1 was riding was 
stopped in the middle of its route between uptown and midtown Manhattan， and 
al passengers were told to get out. Subway breakdowns are not that rare， sono 
one made a fuss. In the New York Times the next day， 1 read that the police had 
arrested a murderer on the train. The man had been on a ki1ing spree，叩dal 
four of the murders had taken place in Brooklyn. Unfortunately， this is the kind 
of thing people tend to associate with Brooklyn and its public housing projects. 
Today a major effort to revive Brownsville is under way thanks to an 
organization called Common Ground (formerly Common Ground Community)， 
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created by housing and community development leader Rosanne Haggerty to 
build and operate permanent housing for the homeless. With the help of funds 
from the federal. state， and municipal governments as well private industry， the 
organization is trying to change the residentiallandscape of neighborhoods like 
Brownsville. One of the key goals is to create local jobs by building 
neighborhoods filed with greenery and shops， unlike the barren landscape in 
and around the projects. Haggerty first gained recognition in the 1990s， when 
Times Square was undergoing a renaissance， by leading the renovation of a 
local hotel to provide housing for the homeless and opening an ice cream shop in 
Times Square to provide employment for formerly homeless residents. Since 
then the organization she has founded has accomplished much on behalf of the 
homeless. In addition， Common Cause's Brownsville Partnership offers 
counseling and other support for residents in such matters as pregnancy， 
parenting， education， employment， housing， and welfare benefits. It also has 
initiatives to support community financing， grafiti clean-up， youth mentoring， 
good nutrition， and crime prevention. Even so， turning Brownsville around 
could take years. 
(3) Protecting Consumers from Globalization 
There are many who look on the continuing globalization of our economy and 
society with a jaundiced eye， and some argue出atwe should be doing more to 
prevent it， given the damage it has done. The reality， however， isthat 
globalization is only picking up momentum. Today， when capital， funds， labor， 
and information are able to flow freely across borders， businesses， factories， 
materials， and products al move about with more freedom than ever， providing 
greater opportunities for employment and success， as well as greater ease in 
obtaining the goods and services one wants. Above all， since culture and 
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civilization have always developed through interaction with other cultures and 
civilizations， globalization is dramatically accelerating the speed at which 
society evolves. 
Trade liberalization and deregulation have allowed us to take part in the 
economic benefits of globalization， but it has also left us exposed to collateral 
damage. We have been told that our workers may have no choice but to yield 
some of the rights they have traditionally enjoyed if J apanese business is to 
survive international competition， but that the government can soften the 
impact of such competition by protecting the rights of consumers and investors. 
This is how it should work in theory. but the reality is another story altogether. 
Worker protections have weakened dramatically in recent years. After 
re即lationsgoverning the use and treatment of non-regular employees from 
temporary staffing agencies were lifted for al but a few occupations， the 
percentage of non-regular workers rose sharply. Such workers are easily fired 
and can claim no unemployment compensation when they are， and largely as a 
result， poverty has emerged as a major problem in Tokyo. Policies to deal 
seriously with the problem on a fundamentallevel have been slow to take shape. 
The problem of unemployment among temporary workers is fundamentally 
a labor-market isue. But instead of addressing the problem on that level， the 
national government has passed it on to local welfare departments. Unable to 
receive unemployment compensation， temporary employees have nowhere to 
go but public assistance. This imposes a heavy and叩 fairburden on local 
government. 
To my mind this points to a failure of the labor-market mechanism in Japan. 
The Tokyo Metropolitan Government has done litle to foster public awareness 
of this problem， let alone offer up policy solutions. It is time for Tokyo to take the 
initiative in developing policies to deal with these prcssing poverty and labor 
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lssues. 
Unlike workers， investors now enjoy fairly rigorous protection. The new 
Securities and Exchange Surveillance Commission has a staff of 360 employees 
charged with monitoring financial transactions on a day-to-day basis to detect 
insider trading and other irregularities and ensure fair trade in stock and other 
financial instruments in one of the world's key financial centers. Laws and 
regulations mandating disclosure of corporate data have grown stronger year 
by year. 
Consumer protection is a somewhat mixed picture. J apan has enacted some 
generallegislation， including the Consumer Contract Law， and has established 
the Consumer Affairs Agency. 1n fact. since former Prime Minister Jun'ichiro 
Koizumi implemented his structural reforms， there has been dramatic progress 
in出earea of consumer law. (1 discuss these changes in detail in the Winter 
2010 issue of]ichitai Homu Kenkyu [Studies in Local Law J.) 
However， while the Consumer Contract Law grants consumer groups the 
right to file lawsuits on behalf of consumers， ithas many shortcoming， 
particularly the absence of penalties for businesses出atviolate it. As a result， 
society is awash in problems caused by contracts that take advantage of 
consumers， and consumer centers are awash in cornplaints about them 
Prominent among the subject of consumer complaints are private nursing 
homes， which now care for approxirnately the same nurnber as the special 
nursing hornes covered by national nursing care insurance. Over and over one 
hears of people who paid a huge upfront fee only to find that they did not receive 
the services they were led to expect. or who moved out almost immediately but 
were unable to get a refund， or who had to be hospitalized at some point after 
moving in and found themselves obliged to pay both the nursing home and 
hospital fes. And cornplaints such as these are only growing more frequent. 
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As head of the Consumers Organization of Japan， accredited by the prime 
minister under the Consumer Contract Law， 1 do not believe these problems 
can be adequately addressed by a nonprofit organizationlike the CO]. Without a 
strong legal framework to support rigorous enforcement of regulations， the 
market wil not function as it should. Given that the increase in private nursing 
homes is directly tied to the shortage of beds in such public facilities as specia1 
nursing homes， convalescent wards， and independent living facilities， itseems 
clear that there is加 urgentneed for market intervention by local government. 
In short. while ] apan has taken decisive steps to strengthen protections for 
investors in the face of globalization， consumer protection lags far behind， while 
protections for workers have grown weaker than ever. In issue after issue， 
]apan's business magazines feature extensive warnings against business scam 
and fraudulent schemes. Clearly the business community itself is a1armed by 
the vast amount of money that is flowing into fraudulent businesses instead of 
supporting the legitimate market. 
Some four decades have passed since J apan's Local Autonomy Law made 
consumer affairs the responsibility of也eprefectural and Metropolitan 
governments. It is time for those governments to recognize that consumer 
afairs are in a state of crisis and respond accordingly. 
4. Urban Governance and Crisis Management 
In the preceding， 1 have examined the increasingly broad scope of the kiki kanri 
(crisis management) concept in] apan and made the case that the application of 
that concept to problems not traditionally associated wi也 crisismanagement 
can help illuminate the nature of those problems and enhance our response to 
them. It seems to me that this phenomenon has occurred because our 
accumulated experience and knowledge of emergency situations has allowed 
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the discipline of crisis management to evolve to th(~ point where it can be 
profitably applied to local government administration and urban governance， 
and also because this approach helps administrators communicate with citizens 
more effectively regarding public issues and administrative e百'ortsto formulate 
and implement policy measures to deal with them. 
That being the case， instead of complaining about the excessively broad 
scope of kiki kanri as the term is used today， perhaps we should regard this 
change as a sign of social evolution and realize that by discussing issues of local 
administration ranging beyond the traditional， narrow concept of cnsls 
management. we can also contribute to the field of crisis management in the 
narrow， traditional sense. It was out of this conviction that 1 decided to write the 
foregoing， knowing ful well that 1 risked the criticism of traditionalists. 
A1though this discussion may cover topics not traditionally included within the 
scope of crisis management. 1 hope it will be taken in the spirit in which it is 
o旺ered，as a preliminary e百'ortto reconcile the field of crisis management with 
the practical challenges of local government. 
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